We present a generalization of the temporal propositional logic of linear time which is useful for stating and proving properties of the generic execution sequence of a parallel program or a non-deterministic program. The formal system we present is exactly that same as the third of three logics presented in LS82], but we give it a di erent semantics. The models are tree models of arbitrary size similar to those used in branching time temporal logic. The formulation we use allows us to state properties of \co-meagre" family of paths, where the term \co-meagre" refers to a set whose complement is of the rst category in Baire's classi cation, looking at the set of paths in the model as a metric space. Our system is decidable, sound and complete for models of arbitrary size, but it has the nite model property, namely every sentence having a model has a nite model. 
Introduction
There is an extensive literature dealing with correctness and termination arguments for non-deterministic or distributed processes, in which the required condition cannot be guaranteed to hold for all possible executions. Rather, one can only guarantee the correctness for a \general", \generic" or \not-exceptional" execution. For example, in study of many probabilistic algorithms (e.g. CLP83, LR81]) one is only able to show that the desirable behavior hold with high probability (i.e. 1).
There is a vast literature on \fairness" conditions (e.g. LPS81, Pnu83, Fra86] where one restricts one's attention to only \fair" executions, with different possible de nitions of fairness. Note that in the motivation for this study there is an implicit assumption that the`fair' execution sequences are most of the execution sequences, that the`general' sequence is fair. (Otherwise it seems necessary to make the algorithm explicitly care about fairness, but then every execution is fair, and then the study of fairness assumptions seems meaningless).
There are many inequivalent de nitions of fairness (see Fra86] ) and there are examples of algorithms which are correct for one notion of fairness but not correct for a weaker notion (see for example LPS81]). The common theme running through all the de nitions of fair executions is the requirement that the algorithm will be correct in the general case. This common theme is the one investigated in this paper.
Lehmann and Shelah LS82] introduced a generalization of the temporal propositional logic, which can be used for stating and proving properties of probabilistic programs, when the properties proved are true for most executions (in probabilistic sense). Their models are stochastic systems, with state transition probabilities. They have presented three di erent decidable axiomatic systems, and showed that they are sound and complete for general models, nite models and models with bounded transition probabilities, respectively. Their language includes, in addition to the connectives usually used in temporal logic, a new connective denoted by r and called \certainly". If a is a formula, the formula ra is true i a is true with probability 1.
When one is reading LS82] one is struck by the fact that there is a vast freedom in choosing the probability distribution in the model constructed in their completeness proof. Namely,`most' executions will have the required properties with almost any reasonable probability distribution. So it seems that there is an underlying notion of general set of executions which is more basic then having probability 1 with respect to a particular distribution.
These are the considerations that led to this work. In this paper we try to formalize the notion of \general execution". We feel that an adequate formalization calls for considering the topology of the space of possible execution sequences, and that the notion of \meagre set" well known to topologists is an adequate formalization of \exceptional", \non general", etc.
Therefore, we suggest to reinterpret the extension of temporal logic suggested by LS82] by interpreting the connective r by \for a co-meagre set of paths", which intuitively means \generally it is true that...". Supporting evidence to this formalism is the fact that for any reasonable notion of \gen-eral",\generic", \fair" introduced in the literature (see for example Fra86]), the corresponding set of execution sequences turns out to be a co-meagre set in the appropriate topology. It turns out that the system introduced by LS82] for nite probabilistic models is sound and complete for this topological interpretation, even when one considers models of arbitrary size. Another very pleasing property of our suggested formalization of the notion of \general execution" is the fact that follows from theorem 8.2 that if we consider a general execution sequence, namely one that avoids any set of rst category that can be described in our language, then every property which is de nable in our language has a nite character, namely if a general sequence has that property then there is a nite initial segment of it, such that every general sequence extending this initial segment has the property.
In LPS81] a proof system is presented for proving termination of fair executions for di erent de nitions of fairness. In that system each proof assumes some underlying well founded relation, for which one can prove that under certain circumstances we get a value which is smaller under this relation. Supplying such a relation may be di cult in practice.
Our approach works only for programs such that their behavior could be expressed using propositional logic. This includes many programs like operating systems where the number of values that can be written in each register is bounded etc. but of course this is not the most general case.
In AS85] the authors considered di erent properties of execution sequences in a topological context. They show that what they called \live-liness" properties are dense in the space of possible executions. We feel that the fact that a certain set of execution sequences is dense is not a su cient argument to suppose that a general execution will belong to this set (for example, the set can be a dense countable set). Dense sets can be made of rather speci c and nontypical execution sequence, and therefore the behavior on a small dense set does not gives the behavior on \most" or \general" execution. For instance, the set of non-fair executions can also be dense. One needs further arguments, for example, if this set is of` nite character', (namely having the required property is determined at nite stage) only then being dense is the same as being co-meagre.
The completeness proof is in principle like the proof of LS82] for nite models, and we would have liked simply to refer the reader as much as possible to this proof. However, their proof for the systems TCB and TCF contains a subtle mistake, and so in order to avoid this mistake we must reverse their proof rede ning one of the key concepts. The proof we give suggests how to x their completeness proof. The mistake and a counter example to one of the key lemmas of LS82] appears in the appendix. We still use as much as possible the proof of LS82]. For readers' convenience we shall repeat all the needed de nitions and quote the lemmas which we can adopt verbatim.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows : In the next section we give basic de nitions and lemmas from set topology to establish a terminology that we will use later. In section 3 we de ne the model of the logical system, and show how the notion of fair executions translates to the concept of comeagre sets . Then we present the language, the semantics , the de nitions of satis ability and validity, and the set of axioms and inference rules in sections 4 to 7, respectively. In section 8 we show that the logical system is sound, and in section 9 { that it is complete. In section 10 we present two examples of the use of our system to prove desirable properties (like termination, mutual exclusion and freedom from starvation ) of parallel programs, and in section 11 we provide concluding remarks.
Some basic results from set topology
This section contains some basic results from set topology that we will use later. Some of the proofs are given in BE87] , while the others are obvious or can be found easily in any introductory book in Topology (see for example Kel55] or Dix84]).
We will use (X; d) or just X to denote a metric space X with the distance function d, and A; B; C; D::: to denote subsets of X. N will denote the set of nonnegative integers, and a nonnegative integer will be denoted by i; j; k:::
Categories of sets
We remind the reader that a subset A of (X; d) is nowhere dense (nowd(X)) if 8B X such that B is open in the metric space X (notation: open(X)) and B 6 = ;,9B 0 B such that B 0 6 = ;;B 0 is open(X) and A T B 0 = ;: De nition 2.1 A subset of X is called \of rst category" (notation: fc(X)) if it can be represented as a union of countably many nowhere dense sets. Note that sets of rst category can still be dense, for example, the set of all rational numbers is dense but is of rst category.
De nition 2.2 A subset of X is called \of second category" (notation: sc(X)) if it is not of rst category.
Notice that if A is sc(X), A is not empty, because the empty set is fc(X).
De nition 2.3 A subset of X is called \ co-meagre" (notation: co-m(X)) if its complement in X is of rst category. It follows from the de nition that if X is a metric space, X is co-m(X).
Lemma 2.4 If A is co-m(X) and B is sc(X) then A T B is sc(X). Lemma 2.5 Let A be an arbitrary size set of rst category sets. If for every member A i of A there is an open set G i such that A i G i , and for every i 6 = j G i and G j are disjoint, then the union over A is of rst category. Lemma 2.6 Let A X. If Paths will be denoted by ; ; ... We will denote the n`th state of a path by (n), and shall use +n to denote the path de ned by +n (m) = (n+m):
A path is legal i 8i 2 N;R( (i); (i + 1)): From now on when we use the term 'path' we mean a legal path.
For a given state s, we will denote by P s the set f j is a legal path, (0) = sg. Notice that for every s 2 S P s 6 = ; because R is serial.
For the logic we consider, every model corresponds to a tree model which satis es the same set of formulas. Hence we will view the model as an in nite tree, where each node in the tree is labeled by a state , where a state is actually a subset of Pvar which hold in this state, the root is the initial state u, and the children of each node s are all and only the members of the set ft j t 2 S,R(s; t)g. So a path in a model is actually a path in the tree which represents the model.
De nition 3.3 Let M =< S; u; l; R > be a model, and let s 2 S. We shall move P s into a metric space by de ning the distance d between any 2 paths 1 ; 2 2 P s , denoted by d( 1 ; 2 ), as follows: if 1 = 2 then d( 1 ; 2 ) = 0, else d( 1 ; 2 ) = 1=n, where n 2 N satis es the following conditions: 1 (n) 6 = 2 (n) and 8m 2 N;m < n ) 1 (m) = 2 (m): Notice that always n 6 = 0 (because we de ne the distance only between paths that start with the same state), and that the distance between two paths is always between 0 and 1.
The idea of viewing a set of executions of a concurrent program as a metric space appears already in AN80, BZ82] , in the context of semantics of concurrent programs.
Let M =< S; u; l; R > be a model. It can be easily shown that for every s 2 S, (P s ; d) is a complete metric space.
De nition 3.4 Let s 2 S; n 2 N. The n-environment of a path 2 P s (notation: n-env( )) is de ned as follows: if n > 0, then n-env( ) = f 0 j 0 2 P s ; d( ; 0 ) < 1=ng. if n = 0, then n-env( )=P s .
The set n-env( ) is the set of paths that coincide with in the rst n + 1 states.
Lemma 3.5 Let M =< S; u; l; R > be a model. Let s 2 S, 2 P s , n 2 N:
The sets n-env( )and P (n) are homeomorphic.
De nition 3.6 The homeomorphism described in lemma 3.5 will be called the natural homeomorphism.
Lemma 3.7 Let < S; u; l; R > be a model. Let s 2 S, 2 P s , n 2 N. If a set G is open(P (n) ) then the set f j 2 P s ;
Fairness in the model
In this section we will show that for some known de nitions given in the literature for fairness, the set of unfair executions is of rst category. For states s; t we will have R(s; t) if there is a process that can transfer the program from a state s to a state t in one atomic action. So each path in the model represents a possible execution sequence of the program and therefore we will often refer to a path as an execution sequence. A terminating state will be a state where the program can not move to a di erent state any more.
Since each path in the model is in nite, a nite execution sequence will be a path in which only the terminating state appears from some point on i.e -a path denotes a nite execution if 9n 2 N such that v is a terminating state and 8m n (m) = v. If a path denotes a nite execution we will call it a converging path.
Let F be the set of all the processes of the program. Our model is not restricted to a countable set of processes, because S can be of any cardinality but in this discussion we will assume that F is a countable set.
For a path and a process f, we will say that f appears in in step n if (n) = s, (n + 1) = t and the process f can be activated at state s of the program and move it to state t. A process f appears k times in if there is A N such that j A j= k and 8i 2 A f appears in in step i. A process f is enabled in in step n if 9t such that the process f can transfer the program from the state (n) to the state t.
Each state in our model can be regarded as a model for propositional logic in an obvious way. A formula in propositional logic will be called a property, and will be denoted by or . We will say that a property occurs in if there is a state along that satis es , i.e. if 9n 2 N such that (n) satis es . consider three types of fairness : Impartiality, Justice and Fairness.
Impartiality. A path is de ned to be impartial if it is either converging or such that 8f 2 F, f appears in nitely many times in the path.
Of course here we assume that if the program is not nite, every process is enabled an in nite number of times in any execution sequence. Justice. A path is de ned to be just if it is converging or if every process which is continuously enabled beyond a certain point appears in the path in nitely many times. Fairness. A path is said to be fair if it is converging or if every process that is enabled an in nitely many times appears in the path in nitely many times. Let M =< S; u; l; R > be a model. We will show that the set of unfair executions is of rst category. Since injustice or not impartial executions are only a special case of unfair executions we will get as a consequence that the set of impartial executions and the set of unjust executions are also of rst category.
Lemma 3.8 Let M =< S; u; l; R >be a model which represents a program.
The set of unfair executions of the program is fc(P u ).
Proof: For every f 2 F we will show that the set A f = def f j 2 P u , f is enabled an in nite number of times in but appears only nite number of times in g is fc(P u ).
Let f 2 F, n 2 N. Let B f;n = def f j is not converging, f is enabled an in nite number of times in , f appears in exactly n times g. Clearly, S n2N B f;n = A f . We will show that B f;n is nowhere dense.
Let G be open(P u ) and suppose G T B f;n 6 = ;. Let 2 G T B f;n . Let i be the index such that f doesn't appear in after step i. Since G is open, 9k
such that the k-environment of is in G. Let m = MAXfi; kg. Since f is enabled in nite number of times in , 9j such that j > m and f is enabled in step (j). Since f is enabled in step j of , 9t 2 S such that R( (j); t).
Let be the path such that 8i 0 i j (i) = (i), (j + 1) = t. Clearly, E = def f The j + 1 environment of g is open(P u ), E G. Since for every 2 E T B f;n f appears in at least n + 1 times, E T B f;n = ;. 2 Francez Fra86] gives a general notion of fairness. He de nes a fairness condition F as a nite, nonempty set of pairs of state properties, F = f( j ; j ) j 1 j Kg, where K is a natural number. Francez then suggests three types of generalized fairness, where is an execution sequence and F a fairness condition:
Unconditional F-fairness. is unconditionally F-fair i for each j, 1 j K, j occurs in nitely often along .
Weak F-fairness. is weakly F-fair i for each j, 1 j K : if j occurs continuously along , then j also occurs in nitely often along .
Strong F-fairness. is strongly F-fair i for each j, 1 j K : if j occurs in nitely often along , so does j .
We call a fairness condition F = f( j ; j ) j 1 j Kg feasible i whenever j holds in a state s there is a set of processes p 1 ; :::; p n and a set of states s 0 ; :::; s n such that s 0 = s, for every 1 i n the process p i can transfer the program from state s i?1 to state s i and j holds in s n . From now on we restrict our attention to feasible fairness conditions ( we believe that these are the interesting cases). A more general de nition of feasible fairness condition can be found in AFK88].
We also assume that in unconditional F-fairness , if the path is not converging, j holds in nitely many times along .
We can show that under the above assumptions, the set of strongly fair paths is co-meagre. The proof is very similar to the proof of lemma 3.8 above. and since the other types of fairness is only a special case of this one, we get that also according to Francez' de nitions (with reasonable assumptions), the set of all fair executions is co-meagre.
The language
Our language is the same language as presented by LS82]. The formulas are composed out of propositional variables, classical connectives, temporal connectives and modal connectives. In the formal de nition that follows, the set of all the formulas, ?, will be de ned, together with the \size" (#) of a formula. Propositional variables will be denoted by p; q; :::; formulas by a; b::::. The set of all formulas of size less or equal to n will be denoted by ? n .
The semantics
In this section we will show how we assign a truth value to every formula in every path of the model. 
Satisfaction and validity
Intuitively, our notion of satis ability says that a model satis es a formula a if a holds for almost all the paths beginning at the initial state. The intuition behind the de nition of satis ability in LS82] is similar, but in their semantics \almost all paths" means a set of paths that have probability one. Here is our formal de nition for satis ability:
De nition 6.1 Let M =< S; u; l; R >be a model and a 2 ? a formula. We say that M satis es a and write Mj = a if the set f j 2 P u , a j M = trueg is co-m(P u ).
Lemma 6.2 Let M =< S; u; l; R >be a model. Mj =a , Mj =ra.
Proof:
): Mj =a)f j 2 P u ,a j M = trueg is co-m(P u ) )(8 ; 2 P u )ra j M = true) )f j 2 P u ,ra j M = trueg = P u is co-m(P u ), )Mj =ra. (: Mj =ra) A = def f j 2 P u ,ra j M = trueg is co-m (P u ) )A is sc(P u ) ( see lemma 2.18 )) A is not empty ) 9 2 P u ,ra j M = true ) f j 2 P u , a j M = trueg is co-m (P u ) )Mj =a. 2
Notice that in any model M =< S; u; l; R > it may happen that both Mj = =a and Mj = =:a. That will happen when the set f j 2 P u , a j M = trueg is sc(P u ), and the set f j 2 P u ; a j M = falseg is also sc(P u ).
The following is an example of such a model: The logical system we use is exactly the same system presented by LS82] for their nite model, with the same numbering. It contains schemata for axioms and rules of inference. An axiom schemata denotes all formulas obtained from it by consistent substitution of arbitrary formulas for the formula variables (a; b; c) appearing in it, and consistent substitution of arbitrary propositional variables for the variables (p; q; :::) that stand for propositional variables. A replacement of a propositional variable by an arbitrary formula is not allowed. The symbol`denotes provability in the system.
The system consists of the following axioms and inference rules. It is not necessarily the most economical.
The axioms: Axiom (A14) intuitively means that if a is possible in nitely many times, a will happen.
Soundness
In this section we will prove the soundness of the logical system given in section 7. First we shall prove two lemmas which suggest some topological features of the set of paths in which a certain formula holds. We will use the following notations : If a is a formula, M =< S; u; l; R > is a model and P is a set of paths in the model, P(a) will denote the subset of paths in P in which a is true, and P +n (a) will denote the set f j 2 P, a j +n M = trueg. Proof: For all 2 P s there is a set G ;n such that G ;n is open(P (n) ) and P (n) (a)4G ;n is fc(P (n) ) and therefore also fc(P s ). By Lemma 2.5, S 2Ps (P (n) (a)4G ;n ) = ( S 2Ps P (n) (a))4( S 2Ps G ;n ) is fc(P s Proof: Let M =< S; u; l; R > be a model and a a formula. The proof is by induction on the formula structure. a = p : if p 2 l(u) then P u (a) = P u ; Else P u (a) = ;. In either case, P u (a)
is almost-open. Suppose that for the formulas a and b, P u (b) and P u (c) are almostopen(P u ). We will show that the assertion holds for the following cases: The meaning of the last theorem was already pointed out in the introduction: If we ignore sets of rst category then every property that can be expressed in the language is of nite character Proof: We will show that if`a, then for any model M =< S; u; l; R > and a state s 2 S, P s (a) is co-m (P s ).
Soundness of axioms A0-A11 is easy . The proof can be found in BE87] and is similar to the soundness proof for these axioms as it appears in LS82]. Soundness proof for A12 and A14 follows :
(A12) r a! ra Let s 2 S, 2 P s . Suppose ra j M = false. We will show that r a j M = false. ra j M = false , ra j +1 M = false , P (1) (:a) is sc(P (1) ).
In the natural homeomorphism f between 1-env( ) and P (1) , f ?1 (P (1) (:a)) =(1-env( ))(: a), so (1-env( ))(: a) is sc(1-env( )). Since 1-env( ) is open(P s ), (1-env( ))(: a) is sc(P s ). Since (1-env( ))(: a) is a subset of P s (: a), the later is also sc(P s ).
So 8 2 P s r a j M = false and especially r a j M = false. 2 (A14) 234a!3a
Let s 2 S. We will show that A = def f j 2 P s ; 234a j M = true and 3a j M = falseg is fc(P s ). We will use lemma 2. That means that P (m) (a) is sc(P (m) ). According to theorem 8.2, there exists a set E which is open(P (m) ) and sets C; D which are fc(P (m) ) such that P (m) (a) = (E S C)?D. Since P (m) (a) is sc(P (m) ), E is not empty. assertion a: P (m) (:a) T E is fc(P (m) ). Proof: Suppose conversely that P (m) (:a) T E is sc(P (m) ); So for every set C P (m) P (m) (:a) T (E S C) is sc(P (m) ), and so for every set D Suppose that for every model M, Mj =a. We want to show that for every model M, Mj =2a. Let M =< S; u; l; R > be an arbitrary model. Clearly, P u (:2a) = S n 2 N P +n u (:a). We will show that for every n, P +n u (:a) is fc(P u ). Let n 2 N, 2 P u . In the natural homeomorphism f between n-env( ) and P (n), f ?1 (P (n) (:a)) = n-env( ) +n (:a). Since j =a P (n) (:a) is fc(P (n)) and therefore n- Let E P u be the maximal set such that for every ; 2 E 6 = ) n-env( ) T n-env( ) = ;. By lemma 2.5 S satisfy. In order to satisfy a rb formula at a path which requires b to be false, we have to construct many sequences starting from the rst state of in which b is true (this motivates the \alternative" relation).
In the rst subsection we repeat results from LS82].
Results from Lemann and Shelah's paper
We will use the following theorem :
(T3)`3a $ a _ 3a 9.1.1 Theories, traces , and relations among them 9.1.1.1 Theories De nition 9.1 A theory is any subset of ?. De nition 9.2 A theory T is said to be inconsistent if there is n 2 Nand formulas a 0 ; a 1 ; :::; a n 2 T such that`a 1^: ::^a n !:a 0 . If T is not inconsistent, it is said to be consistent.
De nition 9.3 A theory T is said to be complete, if for any formula a 2 ?, either a 2 T or :a 2 T. (e)=a , there is a consistent and complete theory T such that :a 2 T.
Relations among theories
The successor relation De nition 9.5 Let T 1 and T 2 be two theories. We say that T 2 is a successor of T 1 and write T 1 T 2 if 8a 2 ? such that a 2 T 1 , we have a 2 T 2 . Lemma 9.6 If T is a consistent and complete theory, there is a unique con- The future relation De nition 9.7 We say that T 2 is a future of T 1 and write T 1 T 2 if 8a 2 ? such that 2a 2 T 1 , we have a 2 T 2 . Lemma 9.8 Among consistent and complete theories the relation is reexive and transitive; it contains the relation .
Lemma 9.9 Let T be a consistent and complete theory and a 2 ? a formula with :2a 2 T. There is a consistent and complete theory T 0 , such that T T 0 and :a 2 T 0 .
The Alternative Relation De nition 9.10 We say that T 2 is an alternative for T 1 and write T 1 T 2 if 8a 2 ? such that ra 2 T 1 , we have a 2 T 2 . Lemma 9.11 Among consistent and complete theories the relation is an equivalence relation.
A consequence is that, if T T 0 , then ra 2 T i ra 2 T 0 . Lemma 9.12 Let T be a consistent and complete theory and a 2 ? a formula with :ra 2 T. There is a consistent and complete theory T 0 , such that T T 0 and :a 2 T 0 .
Whenever R 1 and R 2 are relations, R 1 R 2 will denote the composition of the two relations (R 1 rst, and then R 2 ). Terminal Theories De nition 9.14 A consistent and complete theory T is said to be terminal i it satis es any one of the two equivalent properties:
1. 8a;a 2 ?, 32a 2 T )a 2 T, 2. 8a;a 2 ?, 3a 2 T )23a 2 T. Lemma 9.15 1. Let T and T 0 be consistent and complete theories, such that T T 0 , then , if T is terminal, so is T 0 . 2. Let T be a consistent, complete and terminal theory, then T + T.
Lemma 9.16 Let T be a consistent and complete theory, then there is a consistent and complete terminal theory T 0 , such that T T 0 .
Terminal Relations De nition 9.17 Let T 1 and T 2 be consistent and complete, we say that T 2 is a terminal alternative for T 1 and write T 1 T 2 i 1. T 1 T 2 , 2. T 1 T 2 , 3. T 2 T 1 .
Conditions (2) and (3) together are equivalent to: 8a 2 ?, 2a 2 T 1 ,2a 2
Notice that by lemma 9.15, if T 1 is terminal and T 1 T 2 , then T 2 is also terminal.
Lemma 9.18 Among consistent and complete theories, the relation is an equivalence relation: it is contained in the relation .
9.1.1.4 Basic lemmas Lemma 9.19 Let T be a consistent complete terminal theory and a 2 ? a formula with :ra 2 T. There is a consistent and complete theory T 0 , such that T T 0 and :a 2 T 0 . The theory T 0 is terminal. Lemma 9.20 Let k 0 and T 0 ; T 1 ; :::; T k be consistent and complete terminal theories such that 8i, 0 i < k, T i T i+1 . There are consistent and complete terminal theories V i ; i = 0; :::; k such that:
1. T k = V k 2. V i T i , 8i, 0 i k 3. V i V i+1 , 8i, 0 i < k 9.1.1.5 Traces and relations among them
Since not every consistent theory has a model, we need to restrict our attention to a nite set of formulas. Without loss of generality, from now on we will assume that Pvar is a nite set. Therefore, for every n 2 N , ? n is nite, where we de ne ? n to be the set of all formulas of size less or equal to n. We are interested only in the formulas of ? n , but for the completeness proof we need to consider also some larger formulas. So we de ne n 0 to be slightly larger than n, for example, we de ne n 0 = def 3n + 10. We de ne traces of theories over ? n 0, but we'll claim only about formulas of ? n De nition 9.21 A trace D of size n is the intersection of some consistent and complete theory T with ? n 0. Note that we use here n 0 not n. Since in our proof n will be xed, we will usually use simply the term \trace" instead of \trace of size n". Let D n be the set of all traces of size n. D n is a nite set. We de ne to be the re exive and transitive closure of the relation on traces. Notice that is the re exive and transitive closure of the projection, not the projection of the re exive and transitive closure. Proof: Suppose that= a, we will build a model that does not satisfy a. By lemma 9.4(e), there is a consistent and complete theory T a , that contains :a.
We de ne n = #(a), and look at traces of size n. Let Notice that if D is terminal and R(D; E) then E is also terminal. That is according to de nition 9.17 and lemmas 9.8 , 9.15.
If D E we will call the transition from D to E a -transition. From now on, we will continue using the notation s; t; u::: for the states of the model, keeping in mind that each state is actually a trace of size n.
De nition 9.27 Let m; n 2 N. Let be a path in M. We shall say that is a m,n-standard path if there exist indices i 0 < i 1 ::: < i m such that the following conditions hold:
3. 8j such that 1 j m and 8a 2 ? such that #(3a) n and 3a 2 (i j?1 ), exist i j?1 k < i j such that a 2 (k). 4. 8j, 0 j < i m , (j) (j + 1).
Our de nition of a m-standard path modi es the one given by LS82] :
De nition 9.28 Let be a path in M. We will say that is m-standard if it is m,m-standard. Notice that:
1. If a path is m-standard, then 8i i 1 (i 1 as in de nition 9.28 above) (i) is terminal. Notice that if a path is generic, and if a trace s appears an in nite number of times in the path, then every trace t such that s t also appears an in nite number of times in the path.
The following lemma corresponds to LS82] claim that a generic sequence has probability one.
Lemma 9.36 Let s 2 S. The set f j 2 P s , is generic g is co-m(P s ). Proof: Let s 2 S. We will show that the set f j 2 P s , is not generic g is fc(P s ). f j 2 P s , is not generic g = S t2S f S m2N f S x2Bt;m f S n 2 N A t;x;n ggg where B t;m = def fx j x is a sequence of m + 1 traces s 0 ; :::; s m such that s 0 = t and 8i ,0 i < m, s i s i+1 g, and A t;x;n = def f j 2 P s , t appears in an in nite number of times, but x appears exactly n times in g. Notice that S = D n is a nite set, so it is enough to show that for every t 2 S, m 2 N, n 2 N and x 2 B t;m , A t;x;n is nowhere dense.
Let G be open(P s ), and suppose G 6 = ; and G T A t;x;n 6 = ;. Let 2 G T A t;x;n . 9n 1 such that the sequence x does not appear after (n 1 ). 9n 2 such that the n 2 -environment of is in G. Since t appears in nite number of times in , 9k;k > MAX(n 1 ; n 2 ) such that (k) = t. Since A t;x;n is not empty, we have traces s 0 ; :::; s m , which form the sequence x, such that 8i , 0 i < m, s i s i+1 .
We will de ne the following path 0 (we de ne only its beginning, and as in previous proofs , this is enough) :
There is a path 0 that begins in this way. Since 0 is in the n 2 -environment of , 0 2 G.
Since G is open, 9j, j > k + m such that C = def f The j-environment of 0 g is in G. C is open, not empty, and in every path in C the sequence x appears at least n + 1 times. So C T A t;x;n = ;. 2 Lemma 9.37 Let s 2 S, m 2 N, m < n 0 . The set of generic m-standard paths beginning at s is sc(P s ).
Proof: Let A = def f j 2 P s ; is generic g, B = def f j 2 P s ; is m-standard g. We have proved that A is co-m(P s ) and B is sc(P s ), so by is generic and #(3c)-standard.
Since (i) is terminal, 8 0 k j, (i+k) is also terminal. By lemma 9.20 then, we can nd traces E k for 0 k j such that:
1. E j = (i + j)
2. E k (i + k), 8k, 0 k j 3. E k E k+1 , 8k, 0 k < j.
Let the path be de ned by: Let s = def (0). We want to show that f j 2 P s , c j M = trueg is co-m(P s ). By lemma 9.33 f j 2 P s , is #(3c)-ultimately standard g is co-m(P s ). By lemma 9.36 f j 2 P s , is generic g is co-m (P s ), so f j 2 P s , is generic and #(3c)-ultimately standard g is co-m(P s ). So it is enough to show that 8 2 P s such that is generic and #(3c)-ultimately standard, c j M = true. So let 2 P s be a generic ultimately #(3c)-standard path. We will build a generic #(3c)-standard path 0 such that 0 . We will get Suppose rc = 2 (0). We will show that there is a set Q such that Q f j 2 P (0) , c j M = falseg and Q is sc(P (0) ), and so rc j M = false. Whether (0) is terminal or not, there exists (by lemma 9.12 or lemma 9.19) a trace E such that (0) E, c = 2 E and if (0) is terminal, E is terminal and (0) E. By lemma 9.6, we have E 0 such that E E 0 . We will de ne the set Q as follows: Q = def f j 2 P (0) ; (1) = E 0 , +1 is generic and #(3c)-standard g.
Claim: Q is sc(P (0) ).
Proof: Let A = def f j 2 P E 0, is generic and #(3c)-standard g, B = def f j 2 P (0) , (1) = E 0 g. According to lemma 3.5 there is a natural homeomorphism f between B and P E 0. Clearly, f ?1 (A) = Q. By lemma 9.37 A is sc(P E 0), so Q is sc (B) . B is open(P (0) ), so Q is sc(P (0) ). Proof: By lemma 9.37, the set A of generic #(3a)-standard paths beginning at u is of second category. By lemma 9.38 8 2 A a j M = true $ a 2 u.
By the way we have built M, a = 2 u, so 8 2 A a j M = false. So the set f j 2 P u , a j M = trueg is not co-m(P u ), so M does not satisfy a. 2
Examples
We will conclude by showing two examples of the use of the logical system presented in this paper.
Proving termination property
First we will use the system presented in this work to describe a simple parallel program and prove that it terminates in a co-meagre set of its possible executions. This program appears in LPS81] without the proof of its termination. Consider the following two process program illustrated in gure 2 below::
The propositional variables we will use are:
atl 0 is true i P 1 is in label l 0 . atl 1 is true i P 1 is in label l 1 . atm 0 is true i P 2 is in label m 0 . posy is true i y > 0. We want to show that the program will terminate in all its possible execution sequences, except a set of executions which is of rst category. The program will terminate when P 1 will be at label l 1 , P 2 will be at label m 0 and y will be equal to 0. So the claim we want to make about the program may be formalized in the following proposition:
(G) atl 0^a tm 0 !32(atm 0^a tl 1^: posy).
The following propositions will describe the program:
(A) 2 (atl 0^a tm 0 )! (atl 0^a tm 0 )_ (atl 1^a tm 0 )]^4 (atl 0^a tm 0 )4 (atl 1^a tm 0 )] This proposition expresses the fact that if P 1 is at label l 0 and P 2 is at label m 0 , either P 1 will be activated and will be at label l 1 or P 2 will be activated and will stay at label m 0 , and both possibilities can actually occur.
(B) 2(atl 1 !2atl 1 )
This proposition says that once P 1 will reach label l 1 , it will always be there.
(C) 2atm 0 This proposition says that P 2 is always at label m 0 .
(D) 2(atl 0 _ atl 1 ) P 1 is always either at label l 0 or at label l 1 .
(E) 2(atl 1 !2:posy) Once P 1 is at label atl 1 , y will never be bigger than 0.
(F) 2:(atl 0^a tl 1 ) P 1 can't be in both label l 0 and l 1 at the same time. We can prove that the proposition A^B^C^D^E^F!G is valid (see BE87]). This example will be a very simple minded example of a mutual exclusion protocol. Each process has its own communication register which can contain only the values 0 and 1. A process can read other processes' registers but he is the only one that is allowed to write in his own register. We assume that the registers are atomic, namely in any execution we can assume that the di erent write and read operations can be assumed to be interleaved (compare with Lam86]). Besides this assumptions we are not assuming any relation about the relative timing between di erent processes. An individual protocol is described in gure 3. It is not too di cult to see that if any number of processes perform this protocol then the mutual exclusion of the di erent sections is guaranteed. (If processes A and B are simultaneously in their critical section then each one entered his critical section after writing 1 and then reading all the other communication registers which gave 0. We are referring to the nal writing of 1, before entering the critical section. By our assumption about the atomicity of the registers either the write of A preceded the write of B or vice versa. Without loss of generality assume that the write operation of A preceded that of B. Hence when B was reading the communication register of A he must have read 1, so he would not enter his critical section, hence a contradiction).
The property which is not guaranteed for every execution sequence is the avoidance of starvation or even deadlock. One can easily schedule the actions of two processes trying to get into their critical section such that both keep writing 1, reading the other communication register and getting 1, hence restarting the protocol and so on ad in nitum. (It is a general fact that for any protocol such that each process uses only two values, one can not have mutual exclusion and freedom from starvation for every execution sequence (See for instance AM]). On the other hand one can show that for a co-meagre set of execution sequences deadlock or even starvation is avoided.
Let us describe how a system made of two processes which perform the above protocol can be described in our logic : The two processes will be denoted by A and B. We shall have several propositional variables describing the state of each of this processes, so we shall subscript them by A or B respectively. So for instance Ci A for i = 0; 1 is true if the register of A contain i. Similarly for Ci B . We shall have six propositional variables for each process describing the stage of the protocol it is in: (each one has to subscripted by A or B respectively) atl1, atl2, ..., atl6. Since we are not making any assumption about the timing (besides the atomicity assumption ) each process can stay in the same state arbitrarily long. The atomicity assumption is expressed by the fact that no two "write" or "read" transitions are done simultaneously. The behavior of our system is described as follows (For an axiom where the propositional variables are not subscripted we actually mean the conjunction of the formula where each propositional variable is indexed by A and one which each propositional variable is indexed by B) The formula we are interested in expresses the fact that if one of our processes is not in a sleeping condition in nitely many times then it will be in the critical section in nitely many times (denote it by NS for "No starvation")
23:atl2!23atl5
Another formula expresses the mutual exclusion (ME) :(atl5 A^a tl5 B )
The fact that a process behave according to the protocol and that the registers can have only one value at a time can be expressed by the formula (Called Correctness) 2((atl1 _ atl2 _ ::: _ atl6)^:(C0^C1))
The correctness of the protocol for a co-meagre set of execution sequences (namely if we start from a situation in which mutual exclusion is not violated then in the future it will not be violated and neither process will be starved can be expressed as r (ME^Correct A^C orrect B^A tomicity)!(2ME^NS)]
So that the validity of the formula proves the correctness for a co-meagre set of legal execution sequence. We shall not present here the formal proof which can be rather tedious and can be constructed from the informal argument, but let us just point out that the completeness proof guarantee that such a proof exists.
Conclusion and future work
In this paper we formalize the concept of \general execution" of a concurrent program by considering the topology of the space of all possible execution sequences and looking at \co-meagre" sets in this topology. To support this approach, we have shown that for most reasonable notions of fairness used in the literature, the set of all fair executions turns out to be a co-meagre set in the appropriate topology. We have presented a variation of the temporal logic of linear time that can be used for speci cation and veri cation of properties that hold in the generic execution of a parallel program. The formal system was already suggested by Lehmann and Shelah LS82], but we give it di erent, topological, semantics. Our system is decidable, sound and complete for models of arbitrary size, but it has the nite model property.
In FHLdR79], and also in some more recent work Var85, KP90] it has been suggested to distinguish between non-determinism which is external to the program and caused , for example, by scheduling or relative timing of di erent processes, and non-determinism which is internal to a particular process. Fairness can be applied to both types of non-determinism (see for example AFK88]). Vardi Var85] suggests an analysis of distributed probabilistic message based on the notion of concurrent stochastic process, which partition the state space of the system into two types of states: states in which internal non-deterministic choices are taken, and states in which external non-deterministic choices are take. These two types of states alternate during the execution of the program. A schedule is a subgraph of the execution tree obtained by selecting one branch out of each set of external non-deterministic choices but keeping the full sets of internal nondeterministic choices. Hence it is possible to extract many schedules from the space of all possible executions of a program. In Vardi's approach internal non-determinism is expressed by probabilistic choices, and each choice can be analyzed as a Markov process. A property holds (probabilistically) over a concurrent stochastic process if it holds with probability 1 over every schedule. This approach considers the worst case for external non-determinism, and for internal choices it is ready to ignore a set of executions of measure 0 in each schedule.
The logical system presented in this paper cannot be used to prove properties of programs which depend on the above distinction between internal and external nondeterminism. The system presented by Lehmann and Shelah is also not capable of handling such variants. However, our language can be modi ed to handle such a re ned analysis. One should generalize the operator r to a binary operator r( ; ) having the following meaning: consider a model M =< S; u; l; R > as in de nition 3.1. A -determined submodel of M (notation: M ) is a model < S ; u; l 0 ; R 0 >, where the following conditions hold:
1. S S, 2. For every s 2 S , if is satis ed by the model < S; s; l; R >, then R 0 (s; t) )(R(s;t) and there is no v 6 = t such that R 0 (s; v)), 3. For each s 2 S , l 0 (s) = l(s).
Informally, to get M we prune the original tree (M) in such a way that each state satisfying will have exactly one child. We then say that r( ; ) holds at a state s in M if for every -determined submodel of M starting at s, for a co-meagre set of paths holds. Our unary operator r is a special case of the new binary operator by taking = false. Note that taking = true means \for every branch holds", so the new language covers also the expressibility of the temporal logic of branching time.
The two variants of non-determinism mentioned above can be easily handled in this language by having a propositional variable p which intuitively means that we are in a state where internal non-deterministic choices are taken. The statement that holds in \almost all" executions (no matter what are the external choices) can be expressed by r(:p; ). We are currently working on nding a complete axiom system for this generalized language.
A A Counter Example
In this appendix we give an outline of a counter example to Lemma 24 which appears in page 194 of LS82].
The lemma is stated as follows: Let m be a natural number. Let be a sequence of states of U. If there exists a n 2 N such that: (n) is terminal, for all i such that 0 i < n+m, we have (i) (i+1) and for all i such that n + m i, we have (i) (i + 1) we shall say that is a m-standard sequence.
The reader has probably notice that our de nition of a m-standard sequence is substantially di erent. The reason is that as we prove in the sequel, with the above de nition of m-standardness, for every natural number assigned by the function to the formula b, we can nd a counter example to lemma 24 as it is stated in LS82]. We will show that for every m, we can build a model M and a m-standard generic path (in the sense of LS82]) such that p Until q = 2 (0) but p Until q j M = true, where p; q 2Pvar.
Suppose Pvar=fp; qg and consider the following model M : M has three states : s0; s1; s2. At s0, p = true;q = false, at s1 both p and q are true and at s2 both p and q are false. The transitions are as follows: from s0 we can move to s1 or to s2 or stay at s0, from s1 to s0, and from s2 to s0. Now we construct a legal sequence in this model : we start from s0, we require it to have the following property: If at a certain point k and for some formula a, the set of paths starting from the state at k and satisfying a, is of rst category then the tail of , shall avoid this set. (You do it by induction, at each stage we get a countable list of nowhere dense sets we are required to avoid. They are made up of previous sets we did not run away from, as well as new sets because we have new k's. Now we pick one of these sets and make a nite extension of so as to avoid this set. We can make these \pickings" in such a way that every set we are required to avoid will eventually be picked.) Let T n be the theory made up of all statements holding at the n-th point of . Clearly, for every n T n is complete. Note that in view of the construction of , we have that if ra holds at n then a is in T n ,hence T n is consistent. Now say that a point n of is m -standard of the rst kind if it is the initial point of a sequence that looks like s0; s0; s0...(m+1 times) s1; s0.It is a m-standard point of the second kind if it looks like s0; s0...(m+1 times) s2; s0. Note that by the construction of our sequence it has (for every m) in nitely many m-standard points of both kinds. (The complement is a set of paths described by a formula, which is satis ed only by a rst category set, hence we have avoided it).
A complete consistent theory is said to be good for a particular in nite set of points of our sequence if every formula in it, belongs to in nitely many T n , such that n is in the set.
The following facts are rather easily veri ed: For every in nite set of points there is a good theory for this set. (Proof: Let T be the set of sentences which are true at almost all the points of the given in nite set (namely except possibly nitely many points). Using the particular way we have constructed you can easily show that T is consistent, Hence there is an extension of T to a complete consistent theory T . T is as required because if a sentence a is in T , it must be in in nitely many T n 's from our set, because otherwise its negation is in T, and a can not be in T is the k-th successor of T. Now x m. Let T1 be a theory good for the set of m-standard points of the rst kind and T2 a theory good for the set of m-standard points of the second kind. Recall that T1 and T2 are terminals. We now construct a sequence in the transition system constructed in LS82] which will be a counter example to their Lemma 24.
The sequence will be as follows: trace(T2),trace(T2 ) and from there on any continuation that will make the sequence generic (e.g. since is re exive and is a function we can continue with trace(T1 ), but trace(T2), its rst state does not contain p Until q because T2 is good for the points of the second kind.
Since m was arbitrary it means that no xed length of \standardness" is su cient to guarantee the truth of Lemma 24.
The same modi ed de nition that we used for standard paths (de nition 9.28) will correct the error of LS82] for the probabilistic (measure theoretic) case.
